O n July 7, 2005, at approxmately 8:50 a.m., a seres of bombs exploded on three London Underground trans. One hour later, a fourth bomb exploded on the upper deck of a bus n Tavstock Square. The attacks -the work of four sucde bombers -marked the deadlest bombngs n London snce World War II and the frst sucde attacks n modern Western Europe.
The response of London's emergency servces and transportaton system to the bombngs s consdered the cty's most comprehensve and complex response ever to a terrorst attack. 1 Respondng agences faced challenges durng and mmedately after the attacks, but major problems n emergency coordnaton were mnmzed because London offcals had establshed relatonshps wth one another and had practced agreed-upon procedures. Consequently, everyone knew ther roles and responsbltes; a command and control system was up and runnng quckly; and mutual ad agreements -planned out n advancewere successfully ntated and appled.
Ths artcle s based on our research regardng the multagency response to the London attacks, ncludng barrers and ways to overcome them. As part of that Natonal Insttute of Justce-funded study, we ntervewed offcals from law enforcement, fre and medcal servces, and publc health agences who were drectly nvolved n the July 2005 London response. 2 We asked about ther role durng the response, the strateges for coordnaton that facltated t, the barrers they encountered and possble strateges for mprovng coordnaton among agences respondng to emergences.
LEssoNs LEARNED IN ovERcomING BARRIERs To INTERAGENcy cooRDINATIoN
Our research has helped us dentfy several promsng practces for overcomng barrers and successfully coordnatng wth other agences durng an emergency. These nclude up-front plannng and ongong collaboraton and tranng, such as:
■ Creatng and nsttutng standng procedures for rapdly recognzng and declarng a major multagency ncdent.
■ Havng a standardzed process for multagency preparaton and response that s rehearsed and used regularly for major events -and, therefore, becomes famlar to all emergency response agences.
■ Usng a "lason" model, n whch personnel from one agency are assgned to work at other agences for perods of tme; sharng staff n ths way facltates communcaton and on-ste consultaton across agences.
■ Developng relatonshps to facltate cooperaton among agences by holdng jont tranngs, plannng sessons and nformal socal events (such as off-ste dnners).
■ Encouragng partcpaton of all relevant agences' senor and junor staff n jont tranng and plannng sessons to foster relatonshp buldng, communcaton, trust and apprecaton for each other's roles.
■ Provdng contnued renforcement from senor management through ongong support for annual tranngs and nteractons and dedcatng resources to jont ntatves.
■ Implementng procedures to coordnate and send jont messages to the news meda to forestall panc and exaggerated publc perceptons.
Editor's Note:
In the next ssue of the NIJ Journal, we wll further dscuss challenges faced by the Brtsh agences n respondng to the 2005 London bombngs and lessons learned from them.
Why Do Emergency coordination Efforts Fail?
Lke the U.K., the Unted States faces a range of potental threats that would requre a quck and coordnated response by many agences. Our naton's capacty to prepare for and respond to terrorst attacks, natural dsasters and other largescale emergences -especally ones nvolvng smultaneous attacks at dfferent locatons -hnges on the ablty of agences to communcate wth one another, share resources, and coordnate and execute a jont effort.
Researchers who study coordnated emergency response have dentfed both barrers and promsng practces to help law enforcement and publc health agences mprove nteragency support durng such stuatons. Frst and foremost, we know that multagency coordnaton s a challenge at all levels. Even small problems can be exacerbated when crses occur n several places smultaneously or when reports by the meda heghten publc panc. Over-lappng jursdctons and responsbltes n emergency response can compound budget concerns, nteragency frcton and mscommuncaton.
In our own research, we found four general barrers to nteragency coordnaton:
■ Communication. Agences tend to develop ther own jargon based on ther areas of focus and nternal workngs. The subsequent lack of a common language often mpedes cross-agency communcaton.
■ Leadership. Coordnated plannng and response requre an ongong commtment from agency leaders. Response can fal when a leader of a crtcal partner agency s unwllng to commt qualfed staff and resources because he or she s unconvnced of the benefts to the agency.
■ Cultural differences. Although publc safety and health offcals share the common goal of savng lves, each agency develops ts own cultural standards of behavor that reflect the educatonal and socal backgrounds of ts staff, organzatonal herarchy, leadershp style and core msson.
■ Legal and structural differences. Each agency has a unque nternal herarchy, dfferent processes for workng through the chan of command, legal lmtatons, and varyng geographcal and topcal jursdctons. These dfferences can dscourage, delay or prohbt jont plannng ntatves.
To dentfy promsng practces that can be used to resolve coordnaton barrers n the Unted States and elsewhere, we examned London's response n relaton to a general coordnaton model. Applyng ths model -just one coordnaton model among many -to the 2005 bombngs response provdes an nterestng look at some of the followng nteragency coordnaton promsng practces. whch s the core memorandum among the members and ncludes a comprehensve outlne upon whch London's coordnaton model of emergency response s founded.
The London Bombings: Declaring a 'major' Incident
The manual defnes "major ncdent" broadly so that any emergency response agency can declare a major ncdent and thus ncrease the lkelhood that multple agences wll respond mmedately. A key facet of the London bombng response was, n fact, rapd recognton and declaraton of a major ncdent.
London's standardized command structure
LESLP's manual also descrbes the responsbltes of each agency durng any major ncdent and defnes the general roles that relevant personnel perform on the scene. The roles are defned by three levels of leadershp: Gold, Slver and Bronze. 4 The three levels of command are used across the U.K. for all large-scale emergences. Consequently, relevant agences are famlar wth the roles and responsbltes of each level.
In addton, all agences have agreed that the U.K.'s law enforcement serves as the coordnaton lead. Thus, there s no confuson about whch agency s n charge durng a major ncdent. Because these procedures were already n place at the tme of the 2005 bombngs, there was lmted confuson about the roles and responsbltes of respondng agences.
Joint Training and Planning
The ant-terrorsm branch of the London Metropoltan Polce Servce hosts quarterly jont exercses, known as the Hanover Seres, to practce what to do n the event of a major ncdent. Partner agences and other stakeholders meet n the outskrts of London for weekend tabletop exercses that ncrease everyone's knowledge of roles and responsbltes. Accordng to emergency servce personnel, the practce sessons also ncrease famlarty wth other key personnel, provde the opportunty to test procedures and rehearse the standardzed LESLP command and control system, and help agences learn how to respond and react collectvely.
The exercses use the Slver and Gold components of LESLP's command and control structure and therefore help renforce and mprove multagency coordnaton. Perhaps most mportantly, the scenaros ntroduced durng the Hanover Seres are grounded n practcal, wde-rangng ncdents that requre n-depth plannng and response dutes. These exercses usually reflect local, natonal and nternatonal events and address a seres of ssues to mprove multagency cooperaton.
one voice, one message
Havng a sngle meda spokesperson can help ensure that consstent nformaton s released to the publc n a tmely manner. It can also help avod conflctng and confusng statements from dfferent agences. Shortly after the 2005 bombngs, the Metropoltan Polce Servce assumed the lead poston of a jont meda "cell" and convened a group of publc nformaton offcals from partnerng agences and the central government. The group met quckly after the bombngs to agree upon roles and responsbltes and to develop a jont message. It provded the publc -va the meda -wth a constant stream of nformaton that helped to restore calm and ultmately to dentfy the bombers.
Developing a National coordination model
Snce 2001, there has been an ncreased emphass on multagency plannng and response, and efforts have been taken n the Unted States and elsewhere to develop coordnated approaches. In publc safety and homeland securty, nformal agreements between agences can serve as a frst step toward mnmzng barrers to coordnaton. Informal agreements can allow agency leaders to acheve ther goals through cooperaton rather than drect competton and can help clarfy each agency's expectatons. After workng relatonshps have been establshed, agences may then decde to develop more formal agreements that descrbe the plannng, collaboraton and tranng elements dscussed above. 
Notes

